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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the applicability of a bottom-up evaluation strategy for a first-order
fragment of affine linear logic that we introduced in Theory Prac. Log. Program. 4 (2004) 1 for the
purposes of automated verification of secrecy in cryptographic protocols. Following the Proceedings
of the 12th Computer Security Foundations Workshop (1999) 55, we use multi-conclusion clauses to
represent the behaviour of agents in a protocol session, and we adopt the Dolev–Yao intruder model.
In addition, universal quantification provides a formal and declarative way to express creation of
nonces. Our approach is well suited to verifying properties which can be specified by means of
minimal conditions. Unlike traditional approaches based on model checking, we can reason about
parametric, infinite-state systems; thus we do not pose any limitation on the number of parallel runs
of a protocol. Furthermore, our approach can be used both to find attacks and to verify secrecy for
a protocol. We apply our method to analyse several classical examples of authentication protocols.
Among them we consider the ffgg protocol (Proceedings of the Workshop on Formal Methods and
Security Protocols (1999)). This protocol is a challenging case study in that it is free from sequential
attacks, whereas it suffers from parallel attacks that occur only when at least two sessions are run
in parallel. The other case studies are of the Otway–Rees protocol and several formulations of the
Needham–Schroeder protocol.
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1. Introduction
Linear logic (Girard, 1987) provides a logical characterization of concepts and
mechanisms peculiar to concurrency such as locality, recursion, non-determinism, and
synchronization (Andreoli and Pareschi, 1991; Miller, 1992; Kobayashi and Yonezawa,
1995). Following the paradigm of proofs as computations proposed in Andreoli (1992)
and Miller (1996), provability in fragments of linear logic can be used then as a formal tool
for reasoning about behavioural aspects of concurrent systems (see e.g., McDowell et al.,
1996). In other paradigms for concurrency such as the theory of Petri nets there exist
however a number of consolidated algorithmic techniques for the validation of system
properties. In Bozzano et al. (2000, 2002), we made a first attempt at relating these
techniques to propositional fragments of linear logic, and, more precisely, to the linear
logic programming language called LO (Andreoli and Pareschi, 1991). LO was originally
introduced as a theoretical foundation for extensions of logic programming languages.
The appealing feature of this fragment, however, is that it can also be viewed as a
rich specification language for protocols and concurrent systems. In fact, specification
languages such as Petri nets and multiset rewriting over first-order atomic formulas can
be naturally embedded into propositional LO (Cervesato, 1995). In Bozzano et al. (2000),
we established a connection between provability in LO and reachability of Petri nets
via the definition of an effective procedure for computing the set of linear logic goals
(multisets of atomic formulas) that are consequences of a given propositional program.
In other words we defined a bottom-up1 evaluation procedure for propositional programs.
Our construction is based on the backward reachability algorithm of Abdulla et al. (2000)
used to decide the so-called control state reachability problem of Petri nets. The algorithm
presented in Bozzano et al. (2000) is defined, however, for the more general case of
propositional LO specifications (i.e., with nested conjunctive and disjunctive goals).
A natural way of augmenting the expressivity of the specification language is to consider
first-order fragments of linear logic. First-order formulas can be used, in fact, to colour
the internal state of processes with structured data (Andreoli and Pareschi, 1991; Miller,
1996). The combination between first-order formulas and linear connectives provides a
well-founded interpretation of the dynamics in the evolution of the internal state of a
process (Andreoli and Pareschi, 1991; Miller, 1992, 1996). First-order quantification in
goal formulas has several interesting interpretations here: it can be viewed either as a sort
of hiding operator in the style of π-calculus (Miller, 1992), or as a mechanism to generate
fresh names as in Cervesato et al. (1999).
In Bozzano et al. (2004) and Bozzano (2002) we defined a procedure for the bottom-up
evaluation of first-order LO programs with universally quantified goals. Via the connection
between provability and reachability established in Bozzano et al. (2000), we can view
such an evaluation procedure as a validation technique for specifications of complex
concurrent systems. The bottom-up evaluation procedure is based on an effective fixpoint
operator and on a symbolic and finite representation of a potentially infinite collection of
first-order provable LO goals (multisets of atoms). The use of this symbolic representation
1 According to the usual terminology in logic programming, bottom-up evaluation is intended to denote
derivation of logical consequences of a program, starting from the axioms.
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is crucial when trying to prove properties of parametrized systems, i.e., systems in which
the number of individual processes is left as a parameter of the specification like for multi-
agent protocols with multiple parallel sessions.
1.1. New contribution
In this paper we investigate the applicability of the bottom-up evaluation strategy
of Bozzano et al. (2004) for the purposes of automated validation of authentication
protocols. The design and implementation of cryptographic protocols are difficult and
error-prone. Authentication protocols should be reliable enough to be used in a potentially
compromised environment. Exchanging nonces, i.e., fresh values, is a commonly used
technique which is exploited in combination with cryptography to achieve authentication.
Different approaches have been followed to specify and analyse protocols. An incomplete
list includes for instance using belief logics (Burrows et al., 1989), rewriting techniques
(Denker et al., 1998; Cervesato et al., 1999; Cirstea, 2001), theorem proving (Paulson,
1998), logic programming (Meadows, 1996; Delzanno, 2001; Blanchet, 2001), and model
checking (Lowe, 1996; Marrero et al., 1997; Roscoe and Broadfoot, 1999). Following
Cervesato et al. (1999), as the specification language we will use multi-conclusion clauses
to represent a given set of agents (called principals) executing parallel protocol sessions
by exchanging messages over a network. We will use the Dolev–Yao intruder model and
related message and cryptographic assumptions. Also, enriching linear logic specifications
with universal quantification in goal formulas will provide a logical and clean way to
express creation of nonces.
In this paper we will show that first-order LO (enriched with universally quantified
goal formulas) is a reformulation of basic specification languages used for cryptographic
protocols based on multiset rewriting such as MSR (Cervesato et al., 1999) and CIL
(Millen, 1997). Working in LO, however, allows us to directly exploit the connection
between provability and verification of safety properties that we explored in Bozzano et al.
(2004). The formulation of LO that we propose here is indeed one possible syntax for
an affine fragment of linear logic. However, as we have shown in our previous work
(Bozzano et al., 2002), LO and its non-affine extensions have interesting operational
interpretations in terms of goal-driven reachability. For this reason, having in mind possible
future extensions of our work, we have decided to use LO syntax, and not to base our work
directly on affine linear logic.
In order to reason about security properties, we will apply our general purpose bottom-
up evaluation scheme for first-order linear logic. Our approach is well suited for verifying
properties which can be specified by means of minimal conditions (e.g., a given state
is unsafe if there are at least two principals which have completed the execution of a
protocol and a given shared secret has been unintentionally disclosed to a third malicious
agent). The resulting verification method has connections both with (symbolic) model
checking (Abdulla et al., 2000) and with theorem proving (Andreoli, 1992). Unlike in
traditional approaches based on model checking, we can reason about parametric, infinite-
state systems; thus we do not pose any limitation on the number of parallel runs of a given
protocol (we also allow a principal to take part into different sessions at the same time,
possibly with different roles).
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We have built a prototype, written in standard ML, to implement the bottom-up
evaluation of LO programs (see Bozzano, 2002), which we have used to carry out some
experiments using the approach previously described. In particular, in this paper we present
and analyse well-known examples of authentication protocols taken from the literature
on security, such as the Needham–Schroeder protocol (Needham and Schroeder, 1978),
a corrected version of the Needham–Schroeder protocol, and the Otway–Rees protocol
(Otway and Rees, 1987). In addition we report on the experiment with the ffgg protocol
introduced by Millen (1999). Millen’s ffgg protocol is a challenging case study for the
following reasons. First, the protocol is free from sequential attacks, whereas it suffers
from parallel attacks that occur only when at least two sessions are run in parallel.
Secondly, the scheme underlying ffgg can be generalized so as to obtain higher order
attacks (i.e., attacks that need at least k sessions in parallel). Since we do not need to
put a bound on the number of parallel sessions, the application of our method is sound for
any instance of the protocol. Our experiments show that our methodology can be effective
for analysing interesting aspects of authentication such as secrecy and confidentiality.
1.2. Related work
A wide research area in security protocol analysis is related to rewriting. For instance,
in Cirstea (2001) protocols are specified as rewriting theories which can be executed in
the ELAN system. A similar approach is followed in Denker et al. (1998), where the target
executable language is instead Maude.
In Jacquemard et al. (2000) the authors present an automatic process of compilation
from security protocol descriptions into rewrite rules. The resulting specifications are then
executed using the theorem prover. Unlike that of Denker et al. (1998), which is
based on matching, the execution strategy of Jacquemard et al. (2000) relies on narrowing
and AC unification. Our approach, based on multiset unification, is clearly closer to the
latter approach, although currently we do not support equational theories. All of the above
approaches are limited to protocol debugging; therefore they can find attacks mounted on
a given protocol, but they cannot be used to analyse correctness.
In Genet and Klay (2000) Genet and Klay use term rewriting systems and tree automata
to build an over-approximation of the reachability set for an arbitrary number of protocol
sessions. Tree automata are used to symbolically represent an arbitrary number of
principals’ local states. A rewriting system represents instead intruder and protocol rules.
The over-approximation is computed via a completion procedure applied to automata
and rewrite rules. The method can be used for secrecy but it might return false attacks.
Furthermore, validity conditions on time-stamps cannot be modelled in this framework.
Another approach which shares some similarity with ours is Delzanno (2001), where
a specification for security protocols based on rewriting and encoded in a subset of
intuitionistic logic is presented. The author uses universal quantification to generate
nonces, like us, and embedded implication to store the knowledge of agents. This approach
is still limited to protocol debugging. Differently from our approach, all the above works
are based on a forward search strategy, while the effectiveness of our verification algorithm
strongly relies on a backward search strategy.
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An alternative approach to verifying security protocols is based on model checking.
For instance, the FDR model checking tool was used by Lowe (1996) to analyse the
Needham–Schroeder public key protocol. Other works which fall into this class are
Marrero et al. (1997) and Roscoe and Broadfoot (1999). All these approaches have in
common the use of some kind of abstraction to transform the original problem into a finite-
state model checking problem, which is then studied by performing a forward reachability
analysis. Using a finite-state approximation has the advantage of guaranteeing termination;
however, it only allows one to analyse a fixed number of concurrent protocol runs, an
approach which is infeasible as this number increases. A reduction to finite-state models is
also used in Armando and Compagna (2003) and Armando et al. (2003), where a protocol
insecurity problem is reduced to a planning problem, and then to a problem in propositional
logic which is verified using a state-of-the-art SAT solver. The authors discuss a specialized
encoding and an abstraction/refinement strategy to optimize the search. The approach is
still limited to protocol debugging.
The restriction to finite-state models, however, is not always necessary. As
shown in Amadio and Lugiez (2000), Boreale (2001), Chevalier and Vigneron (2002),
Millen and Shmatikov (2001), and Rusinowitch and Turuani (2001), attacks for a bounded
number of sessions and Dolev–Yao intruders can algorithmically be discovered. In these
approaches constraints relating the knowledge of the intruder and messages sent by honest
principals are incrementally collected during a symbolic protocol execution and solved
only after the session is completed. If a solution to the resulting constraint exists, then the
intruder has a way to break the protocol. Lazy data structures can also be used to explore
the infinite-state search space of an insecure network in a demand-driven manner (Basin,
1999). In contrast to the above mentioned approaches, ours uses a symbolic representation
for infinite sets of states and a backward reachability verification procedure, which avoids
putting limitations on the number of parallel sessions.
Theorem proving techniques are used in Paulson (1998), where protocols are induc-
tively defined as sets of traces, and formally analysed using the theorem prover Isabelle.
Here, analysis is a semi-automatic process which can take several days. The NRL protocol
analyser (Meadows, 1996) provides a mixed approach. It is based on protocol specifica-
tions given via Prolog rules, and enriched via a limited form of term rewriting and narrow-
ing to manage symbolic encryption equations. Similarly to in our procedure, verification
is performed by means of a symbolic model checker which relies on a backward evalua-
tion procedure which takes as input a set of insecure states. Inductive lemmas, which are
generated within the analyser with human help, are used to guide the search.
The Athena algorithm proposed in Song (1999) automates correctness proofs for
models based on strand spaces. In Athena infinite sets of bundles (protocol executions),
are symbolically represented via semi-bundles, a partially ordered event structure made
parametric via the use of first-order variables, and the goal binding relation, a symbolic
representation of several possible ‘useless’ steps of the intruder that may occur between a
send- and a receive-event. Semi-bundles are incrementally refined during backward search,
until all receive-events are bound to some send-event. Similarly to our method and to
NRL protocol analyser, Athena can be used both for debugging and verification, and needs
pruning techniques (e.g., the unreachability lemma of Song (1999) and restrictions on the
capability of the intruder as in the example shown in the appendix of Song (1999)) to
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achieve termination. However, in Athena freshness of nonces is expressed at the meta-
level in the protocol model, and it is controlled during the analysis with special checks on
the origin of messages. In contrast, in our method the use of universal quantification allows
us to reason about freshness inside the logic.
In Blanchet (2001), Blanchet proposes an optimized specification of security protocols
based on an ‘attacker view’ of protocol security, specified by means of Prolog rules, as in
Meadows (1996). The approach has been applied to prove correctness of a number of real
protocols. The verification algorithm performs a backward depth-first search, which seems
to be closely related to our evaluation strategy, and uses an intermediate code optimization
using a technique similar to unfolding, which we plan to study as future work. On the other
hand, we think that the multiset rewriting formalism which we use is more amenable to
an automatic translation from the usual protocol notation. Ensuring faithfulness between
the intended semantics of a protocol and its specification is necessary to prove correctness.
Also, as compared to Blanchet (2001), we use a cleaner treatment for nonces, and we do
not have to use approximations (which may introduce false attacks) except for invariant
strengthening, which can be controlled by the user.
The use of Horn logic is also a characteristic of Cohen’s TAPS verifier (Cohen, 2000).
Unlike Blanchet’s method, the TAPS verifier generates state dependent invariants from the
protocol model. These invariants are combined with lemmas provided by the user. The first-
order theorem prover SPASS is used then to discharge the proof obligations produced by a
proof system used to simplify the invariants according to the capability of the intruder.
While TAPS is very fast and effective, it does not produce readable counterexamples,
a feature that might be very important when searching for justifications of potential
attacks.
As regards the process of translation from the usual informal notation for protocols,
which we plan to study as future work, existing approaches include Casper (Lowe,
1998), a compiler from protocol specifications into the CSP process algebra, oriented
towards verification in FDR, and CAPSL (Millen, 1997), a specification language which
can be compiled into the CIL intermediate language (essentially, multiset rewriting with
name generation) and used to feed tools such as Maude (Denker et al., 1998) or the NRL
analyser (Meadows, 1996). Finally, Jacquemard et al. (2000) presents an automatic process
of compilation into rewriting rules which is able to manage infinite-state models.
As regards the application of linear logic to verification, we would like to mention
Fages et al. (2001), where phase semantics is used to prove properties of specification of
concurrent constraint programs. The phase semantics for LO proposed by Andreoli could
be the possible connection between the manual ‘semantic-driven’ method of Fages et al.
(2001) and our automated ‘syntactic-driven’ method that could be interesting to investigate.
This paper extends the preliminary results discussed in Bozzano and Delzanno (2002)
where the focus was on the ffgg protocol. The technical details of the bottom-up evaluation
strategy for LO∀ programs is described in Bozzano et al. (2004) (where, as a practical
example, we have studied a parametrized mutual exclusion protocol). The first author’s
Ph.D. Thesis (Bozzano, 2002) also contains a detailed presentation and proofs for the
results presented in this paper. Some preliminary results (e.g., the Needham–Schroeder
protocol) were also discussed in Bozzano (2001).
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1.3. Structure of the paper
In Section 2 we present some background material on authentication. In Section 3 we
introduce the language LO with universally quantified goals. In Section 4 we illustrate
our encoding of authentication protocols in linear logic, and we exemplify it in Section 5,
where the ffgg protocol is presented. In Section 6 we discuss the adequacy of the
protocol encoding in linear logic. In Section 7 we discuss the application of our bottom-
up evaluation algorithm for the verification of security properties of authentication
protocols. Section 8 collects some examples of authentication protocols, and discusses
their specification and verification. Finally, in Section 9 we draw some conclusions.
2. Background on authentication
In this section we briefly discuss some background on authentication protocols and we
fix some notation which we will use in the rest of the paper.
Authentication protocols are used to coordinate the activity of different parties (e.g.,
users, hosts, and processes) operating over a network. These parties are usually referred
to as principals in security literature. An authentication protocol generally consists of a
sequence of messages exchanged between two or more principals (e.g., two users and
a coordinating entity acting as a server). The form and number of exchanged messages
is usually fixed in advance and must conform to a specific format. In general, a given
principal can take part in a given protocol run in different ways, e.g., as the initiator of the
protocol or the responder (it is usually said that a principal can have different roles). Often,
a principal is allowed to take part into different protocol runs simultaneously, possibly with
different roles.
The design of authentication protocols must take into account the possibility of
messages being intercepted, and the presence of malicious agents who can impersonate
honest principals. One of the key issues in authentication is to ensure confidentiality, i.e.,
to avoid private information being disclosed to unintended clients. Another issue is to
prevent malicious principals from cheating by impersonating other principals. A principal
should have enough information to ensure that every message received has been created
recently (as part of the current protocol run) and by the principal who claims to have sent it
(replaying of old messages should be detected). Authentication protocols must be designed
in such a way as to be resistant to every possible form of attack. In particular, interception
of messages can prevent completion of a protocol run, but should never cause a leak of
information or compromise security.
Cryptographic primitives are a fundamental, though not sufficient, ingredient of
authentication protocols. A message to be transmitted over a network is usually referred
to as plaintext. The task of a cryptographic algorithm is to convert the given message to
a form which is unintelligible to anyone else except the intended receiver. The conversion
phase is called encryption and usually depends on an additional parameter known as an
encryption key, whereas the encoded message is referred to as ciphertext. The reverse phase
of decoding is called decryption, and usually requires possession of the corresponding
decryption key.
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Authentication protocols (see Clark and Jacob, 1997 for a survey) are usually classified
depending on the cryptographic approach taken, e.g., symmetric key and public key
protocols. Furthermore, a distinction is also made between protocols which use one or
more trusted third parties (e.g., a central distribution key server) and protocols which do
not. In symmetric key cryptography, security of communication requires the keys to be kept
secret between the relevant principals, whereas in public key cryptography, each principal
A has a pair of keys, the first one being the public key, and the other the private key. The
public key is made available and can be used to encrypt messages for principal A, whereas
the private key is only known to A, who can use it to decrypt incoming messages. Some
protocols require the use of digital signature, in order to ensure authenticity (rather than
confidentiality) of the messages. The basic mechanism of digital signature also requires
the use of a public and a private key. The private key is used by a principal to encrypt a
message whose authenticity needs to be certified, whereas the public key can be used by the
receiver of the message to decrypt the message (successful decryption entails authenticity
of the message).
Authentication protocols can be compromised by different forms of attacks (see
also Clark and Jacob, 1997). For instance, freshness attacks typically take place when a
principal is induced to accept, as part of the current protocol run, an old message which
is currently being replayed by a malicious intruder; type flaw attacks take place when a
principal is induced to erroneously interpret the structure of the current message; parallel
session attacks are usually carried out by a malicious intruder who forms messages for a
given protocol run using messages coming another legitimate session which is executed
concurrently; implementation dependent attacks are very subtle and can depend on a
number of ways a given protocol is implemented.
2.1. The Dolev–Yao intruder model
Most formal approaches to protocol specification and analysis, including ours, are
based on a set of simplifying assumptions, which is known as the Dolev–Yao intruder
model. This model has been developed on the basis of some assumptions described
in Needham and Schroeder (1978) and Dolev and Yao (1983). According to this model,
messages are considered as indivisible abstract values, instead of sequences of bits.
Furthermore, the details of the particular crypto-algorithm used are abstracted away, giving
rise to a black-box model of encryption (perfect encryption). This set of assumptions
simplifies protocol analysis, although it has the drawback of preventing the discovery of
implementation dependent attacks.
The Dolev–Yao intruder model consists of a set of conservative assumptions on the
potentialities of any possible attacker. Typically, this model tries to depict a worst-case
scenario, in which there is an intruder who has complete control of the network, so that
he/she can intercept messages, block further transmission and/or replay them at any time,
possibly modifying them. The intruder works by decomposing messages (provided he/she
knows the key that they are encrypted with), and composing new messages. In general, the
intruder knows the identity and, in the case of public key encryption, the public keys of
the other principals. The intruder is supposed not to know the private keys of the other
principals, unless they have been disclosed in some way.
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It has been proved that the Dolev–Yao intruder is, so to say, the most powerful attacker
(Cervesato, 2001a) for the given model under consideration (e.g., perfect encryption),
in the sense that the intruder can simulate the activity of any other possible attacker.
Furthermore, in Syverson et al. (2000) it has been proved that it is not restrictive to consider
a single Dolev–Yao intruder instead of multiple ones.
2.2. An informal protocol notation
In the literature on security, protocols are usually presented by means of an informal
notation. We explain this notation illustrating the so-called Needham–Schroeder public
key authentication protocol (Needham and Schroeder, 1978) (see also Section 8.2). The
protocol, in the usual notation, is as follows.
1. A → S : A, B
2. S → A : {Kb, B}K −1s
3. A → B : {Na , A}Kb
4. B → S : B, A
5. S → B : {Ka, A}K −1s
6. B → A : {Na , Nb}Ka
7. A → B : {Nb}Kb
The protocol is run to achieve authentication between two principals A and B . A central
server S is in charge of distributing the public keys of principals. Messages 3, 6, and 7 are
the core of the protocol, while the purpose of messages 1, 2, 4, and 5 is to get public keys
from the central authority. The notation {M}K indicates a message with content M and
encrypted with a key K . Also, by convention A, B, . . . indicate principal identifiers, Ka
and Kb denote, respectively, A’s and B’s public keys, and K −1s is the private key of server
S (encryption with the private key is used for digital signature).
Now, the protocol has the following structure. A given principal A acts as initiator of
the protocol, and asks the central authority for B’s public key (message 1). The central
authority sends back to A the required key (message 2: B’s identity is included in the
message to prevent attacks based on diverting key deliveries). Principal A creates a nonce
(i.e., a newly generated value), called Na , and sends it to B together with its own identity
(message 3), encrypting the message with B’s public key. Upon receiving this message,
principal B decrypts the message, and in turn asks the central authority for the public key
of A (message 4). After getting the server’s reply (message 5), principal B generates a new
nonce Nb , and sends both nonces, Na and Nb , to A, encrypting the message with A’s key
(message 6). When A gets this message, a check is made that it contains the previously
generated nonce Na , and, if so, a new message, encrypted with B’s key and including the
last nonce Nb , is sent to B (message 7). The protocol is successfully completed provided
that B gets the previously generated nonce Nb .
Completion of the protocol should convince A about B’s identity (and vice versa) and
also provide A and B with two shared values (Na and Nb) which they could use afterwards
for authentication purposes. The use of nonces is ubiquitous in authentication protocols.
Intuitively, a nonce should be considered as some sort of random and unguessable value,
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whose purpose is to prevent a malicious intruder from attempting to break a given protocol
by sending messages and pretending they have been generated by someone else. To
exemplify, an attacker could possibly pretend to be principal B , intercept message 6, and
replace it with a different message. However, the message created by the attacker will never
be accepted as a legitimate message by A, unless it contains the nonce Na . Unfortunately
(for the attacker) nonce Na is not known except to B (and A, of course), because only B
can decrypt message 3. Intuitively, assuming A and B behave honestly and their private
keys are not known to anyone else, and assuming that nonces are not guessable, the
protocol should prevent a malicious intruder from impersonating one of the two principals.
However, under certain conditions, this protocol fails to achieve authentication (Lowe,
1995). We will discuss this point in Section 8.2.
3. The specification language LO∀
LO (Andreoli and Pareschi, 1991) is a logic programming language based on a fragment
of LinLog (Andreoli, 1992). Its mathematical foundations lie in a proof-theoretical
presentation of a fragment of affine linear logic (i.e., linear logic with weakening)
defined over the linear connectives (linear implication; we use the reversed notation
H G for GH ), & (additive conjunction), (multiplicative disjunction), and
the constant  (additive identity). In this section we present the proof-theoretical
semantics, corresponding to the usual top-down operational semantics for traditional logic
programming languages, for an extension of LO. First of all, we consider a slight extension
of LO which admits the constant ⊥ in goals and clause heads. More importantly, we allow
the universal quantifier to appear, possibly nested, in goals. This extension is inspired
by multiset rewriting with universal quantification (Cervesato et al., 1999). The resulting
language will be called LO∀ hereafter.
Following Andreoli and Pareschi (1991), we give the following definitions. Let Σ be
a signature with predicates including a set of constant and function symbols L and a set
of predicate symbols P , and let V be a denumerable set of variables. An atomic formula
over Σ and V has the form p(t1, . . . , tn) (with n ≥ 0), where p ∈ P and t1, . . . , tn are
(non-ground) terms in TVΣ . We denote the set of such atomic formulas as AVΣ , and the set of
ground (i.e., without variables) atomic formulas as AΣ . Finally, given a formula F , FV(F)
is the set of free variables of F .
The classes of G-formulas (goal formulas), and D-formulas (multi-headed clauses) over
Σ and V are defined by the following grammar:
G ::= G G | G & G | ∀x .G | A |  | ⊥
H ::= A · · · A | ⊥
D ::= ∀ (H G)
where A stands for an atomic formula over Σ and V , and ∀ (H G) stands for
∀x1 · · · xk . (H G), with {x1, . . . , xk} = FV(H G).
An LO∀ program over Σ and V is a set of D-formulas over Σ and V . A multiset of goal
formulas will be called a context hereafter. In the following we usually omit the universal
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Fig. 1. A proof system for LO∀.
quantifier in D-formulas, i.e., we consider free variables as being implicitly universally
quantified. Let ΣP be a signature with predicates and V a denumerable set of variables. An
LO∀ sequent has the form
P Σ G1, . . . , Gk,
where P is an LO∀ program over ΣP and V , G1, . . . , Gk is a context over Σ and V , and
Σ is a signature such that ΣP ⊆ Σ . We will use SigP to denote the set of all possible
extensions of ΣP (the top-down construction of LO proofs, and in particular the rule
dealing with the universal quantifier, may require extending the original signature, as we
will explain in Section 3.1).
3.1. Top-down provability
We now define provability in LO∀. Let Σ be a signature with predicates and V a
denumerable set of variables. Given an LO∀ program P over ΣP and V , and a signature
Σ such that ΣP ⊆ Σ , the set of ground instances of P , denoted GndΣ (P), is defined as
follows:
GndΣ (P) = {(H G)θ | ∀(H G) ∈ P},
where θ is a grounding substitution for H G (i.e., it maps free variables in FV(H G)
to ground terms in TΣ ). The execution of a multiset of G-formulas G1, . . . , Gk over Σ in
P corresponds to a goal-driven proof for the LO∀ sequent P Σ G1, . . . , Gk .
The operational semantics of LO∀ is given via the uniform (focusing) (Andreoli, 1992)
proof system presented in Fig. 1, where P is a set of clauses, A is a multiset of atomic
formulas, and ∆ is a context, i.e., a multiset of G-formulas. We have used the notation Ĥ ,
where H is a linear disjunction of atomic formulas a1 . . . an , to denote the multiset
a1, . . . , an (by convention, ⊥̂ = , where  is the empty multiset). We say that G is
provable from P if there exists a proof tree, built over the proof system of Fig. 1, with
root P Σ G, and such that every branch is terminated with an instance of the r axiom.
The proof system of Fig. 1 is a specialization of more general uniform proof systems for
linear logic such as Andreoli’s focusing proofs (Andreoli, 1992) and Forum (Miller, 1996).
Rule bc is analogous to a backchaining (resolution) step in traditional logic programming
languages. Note that according to the concept of resolution explained above, bc can be
executed only if the right-hand side of the current LO sequent consists of atomic formulas.
As an instance of rule bc, we get the following proof fragment, which deals with the case
of clauses with empty head:
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...
P Σ A, G
P Σ A bc
provided that ⊥ G ∈ GndΣ (P)
Given that clauses with empty head are always applicable in atomic contexts, the degree
of non-determinism they introduce in proof search is usually considered unacceptable
(Miller, 1996) and in particular they are forbidden in the original presentation of
LO (Andreoli and Pareschi, 1991). However, our computational model, i.e., bottom-up
evaluation, does not suffer this drawback. Clauses with empty head often allow more
flexible specifications (see, e.g., Section 4).
LO clauses having the form H  play the same role as axioms (i.e., unit clauses) for
Horn programs. In fact, when a backchaining step over such a clause is possible, we get
a successful (branch of) computation, independently of the current context A, as shown in
the following proof scheme:
P Σ ,A r
P Σ Ĥ ,A
bc
provided that H  ∈ GndΣ (P)
The previous observation can be stated as follows. Let  denote the multiset inclusion
relation. Given an LO∀ program P and two multisets of goals ∆, ∆′ such that ∆  ∆′,
if P Σ ∆ then P Σ ∆′. This property is known as admissibility of the weakening rule
(Bozzano et al., 2004). It qualifies the language LO as being a subset of affine linear logic.
Finally, rule ∀r can be used to dynamically introduce new names. The initial signatureΣ
must contain at least the constant, function, and predicate symbols of a given program P ,
and it can dynamically grow thanks to rule ∀r . Every time rule ∀r is fired, a new constant c
is added to the current signature, and the resulting goal is proved in the new one. The idea is
that all terms appearing on the right-hand side of a sequent are implicitly assumed to range
over the relevant signature. This behaviour is standard in logic programming languages
(Miller et al., 1991).
Example 3.1. Let Σ be a signature with a constant symbol a, a function symbol f , and
predicate symbols p, q , r , s. Let P be the program consisting of the clauses
1. r(w) q( f (w)) s(w)
2. s(z) ∀x .p( f (x))
3. ⊥ q(u) & r(v)
4. p(x) q(x) 
The goal s(a) is provable from P . The corresponding proof is shown in Fig. 2 (where
bc(i) denotes the backchaining rule over clause number i of P). Notice that the notion of
ground instance is relative to the current signature. For instance, backchaining over clause
3 is possible because the corresponding signature contains the constant c, and therefore
⊥ q( f (c)) & r(c) is a valid instance of clause 3.
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Fig. 2. An example of LO∀ proof.
In the rest of the paper we will focus our attention on an observational semantics that
captures the provability of a restricted form of LO∀ goals, namely goals consisting of a
multiset of ground atomic formulas. Specifically, given a program P we define its top-
down operational semantics as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Operational Semantics). Given an LO∀ program P , its operational
semantics, denotedO(P)P , is given by
O(P) = {A | A multiset of ground atoms in AΣP , P ΣP A}.
Notice that a multisetA = A1, . . . , Ak (in the r.h.s. of a sequent) is logically equivalent to
the multiplicative disjunction A1 . . . Ak .
4. Specifying authentication protocols in LO∀
In this section we introduce, rather informally, some generalities about our encoding of
protocols in linear logic. Our specification language has a natural correspondence with the
multiset rewriting formalism MSR proposed in Cervesato et al. (1999). This connection
will be formally discussed in Section 6.
First of all, we need a representation for the entities (e.g., principals and messages)
involved. In particular, we will use the notation
pr(id, s)
to denote a principal with identifier id and internal state s. The internal state s can store
information about an ongoing execution of a protocol (the identifier of another principal,
which step of the protocol has been executed, the role of the principal, and so on). Typically,
the state s will be a term such as init (indicating the initial state of a principal, before
protocol execution), or a term such as
stepi (data),
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where the constructor stepi denotes which is the last step executed and data represents
the internal data of a principal. We allow more than one atom pr(id, ) inside a given
configuration. In this way, we can model the possibility for a given principal to take part in
different protocol runs, possibly with different roles. Messages sent over a given network
can in turn be represented by terms such as
n(mess content),
where mess content is the content of the message. Depending on the particular protocol
under consideration, we can fix a specific format for messages. For instance, a message
encrypted with the public key of a principal a could be represented as the term
enc(pubk(a), mess content).
Finally, we will use the Dolev–Yao intruder model (see Cervesato et al., 1999) and the
associated assumptions. In particular, we use terms such as
m(inf )
to represent the information in possession of the intruder (m stands for the internal memory
of the intruder). At any given instant of time, we can think of the current state of a
given system as a multiset of atoms representing principals and messages currently on
the network, and the intruder knowledge.
Following Cervesato et al. (1999), we represent the environment in which protocol
execution takes place by means of: a protocol theory, which includes rules for every
protocol role (typically, one rule for every step of the protocol), and an intruder theory,
which formalizes the set of possible actions of a malicious intruder who tries to break
the protocol. In addition, it is possible to have additional rules for the environment. Rules
assume the general format
F1 . . . Fn ∀x1 . . .∀xk . G1 . . . Gm
where Fi , Gi are atomic formulas (representing, e.g., principals or messages), xi are
variables, and all free variables are implicitly universally quantified. As explained in
Section 3, the standard semantics for the universal quantifier requires new values to be
chosen before application of a rule. We use this behaviour to encode nonce generation
during protocol runs. As a result, we get for free the assumption (required by the
Dolev–Yao model) that nonces are not guessable. The generic intruder theory introduced
in Cervesato et al. (1999) can be directly reformulated in our framework by introducing a
concatenation operator for forging new messages starting from simpler ones. For instance,
let cons be such a binary constructor. Then, a message consisting of three components a,
b, and c, can be represented as a term cons(a, cons(b, c)). Under these assumptions, the
intruder theory contains generic rules of the following form (see Cervesato et al., 1999, for
more details):
n(X) m(X) (intercept)
m(cons(X, Y )) m(X) m(Y ) (decompose)
m(X) m(Y ) m(cons(X, Y )) (compose)
. . .
m(X) m(X) n(X) (forge)
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Through these rules, the intruder can forge messages of arbitrary shape. However, as shown
in Lowe (1999), the intruder only needs to generate messages that the honest agents can
recognize. The shape of these messages is determined by the protocol rules. Following this
idea, in this paper we will define intruder theories specific to every example by specializing
the generic rules of Cervesato et al. (1999) to the message patterns of the protocol taken
into consideration. We will further discuss this point in Section 9.
We allow a partial specification of the set of initial states. This strategy is more flexible
in that it may help us to find additional hypotheses under which a given attack might take
place. As a general rule, the partial specification of the initial states that we have chosen
requires every principal to be in his/her initial state (represented by the term init) at the
beginning of protocol execution.
We conclude this section by collecting together some rules which are common to all the
examples presented in the rest of the paper. We will use these conventions: free variables
inside a rule are always implicitly universally quantified, and variables are written as upper-
case identifiers. We have two rules for the environment:
e1) ⊥ ∀ID.(pr(ID, init))
e2) pr(Z , S) pr(Z , S) pr(Z , init)
The first rule allows the non-deterministic creation of new principals (we use the universal
quantifier to generate new identifiers for them), whereas the second one allows creation of
a new instance of a given principal (this allows a principal to start another execution of
a given protocol with a new and possibly different role). Both rules can be fired at run-
time, i.e., during the execution of a given protocol. Thus, we will always work in an open
environment with multiple sessions running in parallel between several agents. We use the
term init to denote the initial state of any given principal. Finally, we have the following
two rules for the intruder theory:
t1) pr(Z , S) pr(Z , S) m(Z)
t2) ⊥ ∀N.(m(N))
The first rule allows the intruder to store a principal identifier, whereas the second one
formalizes the capability of the intruder of generating new values (e.g., nonces).
To exemplify the protocol encoding introduced in this section, in the following section
we will present the ffgg protocol. Other examples of protocols and their analysis will be
discussed in Section 8.
5. An example: Millen’s ffgg protocol
Although an artificial protocol, Millen’s ffgg protocol (Millen, 1999) provides an
example of a parallel session attack, which requires running at least two processes for the
same role. It has been proved (Millen, 1999) that no serial attacks exist, i.e., the protocol
is secure if processes are serialized. The protocol is as follows.
1. A → B : A
2. B → A : N1, N2
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Fig. 3. Specification of the ffgg protocol.
3. A → B : {N1, N2, S}Kb %{N1, X, Y }Kb
4. B → A : N1, X, {X, Y, N1}Kb
N1 and N2 stand for nonces, created by principal B and included in message 2. The m%m′
notation, introduced in Lowe (1998), used in message 3 represents a message which has
been created by the sender according to format m, but is interpreted as m′ by the receiver. In
this case, the intuition is that upon receiving message 3, B checks that the first component
does correspond to the first of the two nonces previously created, while no check at all is
performed on the second component of the message. In message 3, S stands for a secret,
of the same length as a nonce, which is in possession of A. The security property that one
is interested in analysing is whether the secret S can be disclosed to a malicious intruder.
We have implemented the ffgg protocol through the specification shown in Fig. 3, while
the intruder theory is presented in Fig. 4. The specification consists of a set of protocol
rules (rules p1 to p5 in Fig. 3) and an intruder theory (rules i1 to i12 in Fig. 4). We remind
the reader that the rules e1, e2, t1, and t2 discussed in Section 4 are in addition to the
present rules. Protocol rules directly correspond to the informal description of the ffgg
protocol previously presented. We have followed the conventions outlined in Section 4
to model the internal state of principals. In particular, we have a term init denoting the
initial state of a principal, and the constructors stepi to model the different steps of a
protocol run. At every step, each principal needs to remember the identifier of the other
principal that he/she is executing the protocol with. In addition, at step 2 the responder
stores the first nonce created (in order to be able to perform the required check; see rule
p4), and at step 3 the initiator of the protocol remembers the secret S. We have modelled
the secret S using the universal quantifier, as for nonces. In this way, we can get for free
the requirement that the secret initially is only known to the principal who possesses it.
Finally, we have the term constructors plain(. . .) and enc(. . .) (to be precise, we should
say a family of term constructors, as we find it convenient to overload the same symbol
with different arities). The plain constructor is used to group plain components inside
messages, whereas the enc constructor is used to represent encryption (the first argument
is the key the message is to be encrypted with, and the second component is the message
content).
The intruder theory is made up of rules i1 to i12 in Fig. 4. Let us discuss it in more
detail. Rules i1 to i4 are the basic decomposition rules. We have four rules dealing with the
different formats of messages exchanged in the ffgg protocol. For instance, rule i1 deals
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Fig. 4. Intruder theory for the ffgg protocol.
with decomposition of plain messages with one component, whereas rule i4 deals with
decomposition of messages with two plain components and one encrypted component, and
so on. It is assumed that the intruder cannot further decompose encrypted components,
which in fact are stored exactly as they are, whereas plain messages are decomposed
into their atomic constituents. Rules i5 to i8 are the basic composition rules. As for the
decomposition rules, each rule deals with a different message format. It is easy to see that
these composition and decomposition rules are specializations of the generic intruder rules
presented in Section 4.
In addition to the previous rules, we have formalized some further capabilities of the
intruder (rules i9 to i12). In particular, rules i9 and i10 allow the intruder to decompose
messages that are directly addressed to himself/herself, whereas rules i11 and i12 allow
the intruder to encrypt messages, starting from previously stored plain components, using
an arbitrary key. Even if these capabilities are not strictly required to illustrate the attack
which can mounted on the ffgg protocol (as we will see in Section 8.1), they have been
added for completeness. These same capabilities, in contrast, are crucial in the case of the
Needham–Schroeder protocol (see Section 8.2).
The intruder theory that we have presented is an instance of the general Dolev–Yao
intruder theory, in that intruder rules have been tailored to the particular form of
messages used in the specific protocol under consideration, an optimization often taken
by verification methods (Jacquemard et al., 2000).
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After presenting the encoding of protocols in linear logic and the ffgg protocol as an
example, in the following section we will discuss the relationships between derivations
in the LO∀ theory and MSR (Cervesato et al., 1999), a consolidated interleaving
computational model for cryptographic protocols.
6. Adequacy of LO∀-based protocol specifications
To prove the adequacy of our encoding of authentication protocols, we take as reference
model the MSR language proposed in Cervesato et al. (1999). This language is based on
multiset rewriting over first-order atomic formulas and has been used as reference model
in several papers in the literature on security protocols.
The language MSR is strictly related to a fragment of linear logic which turns out to
be dual with respect to ours. Specifically, an MSR rule can be interpreted as a linear logic
formula defined as
A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ An  ∃x . B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Bm,
where ⊗ is a linear logic multiplicative conjunction, meaning that A1, . . . , An evolve into
B1, . . . , Bm by creating a new name for x .
In LO with universal quantification the same effect is obtained via the clause
A1 . . . An ∀x .B1 . . . Bm .
In fact, in the goal-driven proof system of LO a computation step is obtained by
resolution (i.e., by reducing the conclusion of a clause to its premise). In the framework of
Cervesato et al. (1999) the rules are applied by rewriting the premise into the conclusion.
It is easy to see that the effects of quantification are the same in the two cases. The
immersion of MSR in linear logic and the duality of ⊗ and give us an immediate
proof of equivalence of the two formalisms. However, in order to illustrate the operational
flavour of LO, in the rest of the section we will present a direct comparison with rewriting
in MSR. Let us illustrate this idea with the help of an example. Let Σ be a signature
with two constant symbols a and b, one function symbol f , and two predicate symbols
p, q . Let V be a denumerable set of variables and w, x, y ∈ V . Let P consist of the LO
formula
∀x, y, z.p(x) q( f (y)) p( f (x)) q(y) q( f (x))
and G = {p(a) p(b) q( f (b))}. Fig. 5 shows one possible sequence of applications of
LO proof rules that start from the sequent P Σ G. It is important to note that every bc rule
basically rewrites the head of a ground instance of a rule in P (whose atoms are underlined
in the previous figure) into its body. This property allows us to represent computations via
LO∀ derivations, i.e., sequences of multiset rewriting steps defined over (ground) atomic
formulas. In the rest of this section we will formalize the connection between MSR and
LO∀.
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Fig. 5. A fragment of LO∀ proof.
6.1. MSR
An MSR specification consists of a set of multiset rewriting rules over first-order atomic
formulas with quantification on the right-hand side, namely formulas such as
A1, . . . , An → ∃x1. . . . ∃xk . B1, . . . , Bm
where all free variables are considered as universally quantified. An MSR configurationM
is a multiset of ground atomic formulas. The operational semantics of an MSR specification
S is defined via the following one-step rewriting relation defined over pairs 〈M,Σ 〉
consisting of an MSR configuration M and of a signature Σ containing the function and
constant symbols occurring in S andM.
Let M1 be an MSR configuration. Suppose that there exists a ground instance of an
MSR ruleN1 → ∃x1. . . .∃xk .N2 in S such thatM1 = N1 + Q for some configuration Q
(where ‘+’ denotes multiset union). Then, 〈M1,Σ 〉 ⇒ 〈N2[c1/x1, . . . , ck/xk] + Q,Σ ′〉
where c1, . . . , ck /∈ Σ , and Σ ′ = Σ ∪ {c1, . . . , ck}. In the following we will use ∗⇒ to
denote the reflexive and transitive closure of ⇒. An MSR configuration M1 is reachable
from M0 if 〈M0,Σ0〉 ∗⇒ 〈M1,Σ1〉 for some Σ1, where Σ0 is the signature associated
with S andM0.
We now define an embedding of MSR into LO∀. Given an MSR rule R
A1, . . . , An → ∃x1. . . . ∃xk . B1, . . . , Bm
we define lo(R) as the (universally quantified) LO∀ clause
∀(A1 . . . An ∀x1. . . .∀xk . B1 . . . Bm).
Given an MSR specification S consisting of the MSR rules R1, . . . , Rq , we naturally
extend the mapping lo to S as follows: lo(S) = {lo(R1), . . . , lo(Rq)}. Let us now use
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the notation Seq Seq′ to denote a partial LO∀derivation of sequent Seq′ from sequent Seq
having the form of a single branch. Then, the following result holds.
Proposition 6.1 (Adequacy of the LO∀ Encoding of MSR). Let S be an MSR specifica-
tion, M0 and M1 be two MSR configurations. If 〈M0,Σ0〉 ∗⇒ 〈M1,Σ1〉 in S, then
lo(S) Σ1M1 lo(S) Σ0M0.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of rewriting steps K needed to go from
〈M0,Σ0〉 to 〈M1,Σ1〉.
• The thesis immediately holds for K = 0 (i.e., M0 =M1).
• Now, suppose K > 0, i.e., 〈M0,Σ0〉 ∗⇒ 〈M,Σ 〉 ⇒ 〈M1,Σ1〉.
Then, by inductive hypothesis we assume lo(S) ΣM lo(S) Σ0M0.
Furthermore, since 〈M,Σ 〉 ⇒ 〈M1,Σ1〉, there exists a ground instance R of an
MSR ruleN1 → ∃x1. . . . ∃xk .N2 in S such thatM = N1+Q for some configuration
Q,M1 = N2[c1/x1, . . . , ck/xk]+Q, andΣ1 = Σ∪{c1, . . . , ck} for c1, . . . , ck /∈ Σ .
By definition of the mapping lo, it is easy to check that N1 ∀x1. . . .∀xk . N2 is a
ground instance of lo(R), where A1, . . . , An = A1 . . . An .
Since ̂N = N , we can apply an instance of the bc rule to sequent Seq1 = lo(S) Σ
M obtaining the sequent Seq2 = lo(S) Σ ∀x1. . . .∀xk .N2, Q. By applying the ∀r
rule k times, we get Seq3 = lo(S) Σ1 N2[c1/x1, . . . , ck/xk], Q.
Finally, assuming that N2[c1/x1, . . . , ck/xk] = B1 . . . Bm , by applying the
r rule m times we obtain Seq = lo(S) Σ1 N2[c1/x1, . . . , ck/xk], Q. Since
M1 = N2[c1/x1, . . . , ck/xk] + Q, we have proved the thesis. 
Let us now call simple an LO∀ clause R having the following form:
∀(A1 . . . An ∀x1. . . .∀xk . B1 . . . Bm)
The corresponding MSR rule msr(R) is defined as
A1, . . . , An → ∃x1. . . . ∃xk . B1, . . . , Bm
A simple LO∀ specification consists of simple LO∀ clauses only. The above mapping
extends from rules to specifications in a straightforward manner. Then, the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 6.2 (Adequacy of the MSR Encoding of LO∀). Let T be a simple LO∀
specification, M0 and M1 be two MSR configurations. If T Σ1 M1 T Σ0 M0
then 〈M0,Σ0〉 ∗⇒ 〈M1,Σ1〉in msr(T ).
Proof. We first note that partial derivations for simple LO∀ theories have only a single
proof branch (clauses have no additive conjunction in the body). The proof is then by
induction on the length of the single branch in the derivation T Σ1 M1 T Σ0 M0.
The proof is carried out quite similarly to that of the previous proposition, the only
interesting case being the inductive step. Since proofs in LO∀ are goal driven we are forced
to apply in sequence an instance of the bc rule with respect to a clause R, the ∀r rule a finite
number of times, and, finally, the r rule a finite number of times, until the current goal
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Fig. 6. A logical representation of an infinite set of unsafe configurations for the ffgg protocol.
consists of atomic formulas only. As shown in the previous proposition, this proof scheme
precisely mimics an application of the MSR rule msr(R). 
Thanks to the previous property and from the observation that we have adopted the same
style for the specification of protocols proposed in Cervesato et al. (1999), we can state the
following result.
Proposition 6.3 (Adequacy of the Encoding). Every interleaving execution of a protocol
S specified in MSR (with or without an intruder) is represented by a partial LO∀ derivation
in lo(S). Vice versa, every partial LO∀ derivation of a protocol T specified in simple LO∀
represents an interleaving execution of the protocol msr(T ).
7. Verification of security properties
Several practical examples of safety properties present the following interesting feature:
their negation can be represented by means of the upward closure (to be defined formally in
Section 7.1) of a collection of minimal violations (similarly to the specification of mutual
exclusion properties of communication protocols Abdulla et al. (2000)). Intuitively, this
property means that whenever a given configuration is considered to be unsafe (e.g., two
principals are running a protocol session, and a given secret has been unintentionally
disclosed to the intruder) every possible extension of this configuration is still unsafe (e.g.,
no matter how many additional principals are running, no matter how many additional
messages are being exchanged on the network).
Thanks to this property, it often becomes possible to finitely represent infinite collections
of unsafe configurations (i.e., by means of finite configurations representing their minimal
violations). Symbolic procedures can then be applied in order to saturate the set of
predecessor states (by iteratively applying a transition relation backwards2). Using this
method and assuming that a fixpoint is eventually reached, it is possible then to establish
which initial states lead to violations of the property. This observation can be applied in
our setting in order to specify interesting security properties.
Let us see an example. In the case of the ffgg protocol, we can consider a configuration
to be unsafe if there exists a run of the protocol between two honest principals, say alice
and bob, such that alice has generated the secret S (at step 3 of the protocol execution), bob
has run the protocol to completion with alice (step 4), and the secret S has been disclosed
to the intruder (i.e., it is eventually stored in the intruder’s internal memory). In our setting
a configuration is represented as a multiset of atomic formulas. In order to symbolically
represent all possible configurations in which a violation might occur, we can use then
the LO∀ clause in Fig. 6. Every top-down derivation leading from an initial goal (state)
2 Given that sets of unsafe configurations are encoded via logical axioms, computing the backward reachability
set of a transition relation amounts to evaluating the corresponding logic program in a bottom-up fashion.
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to an instance of the axiom r obtained by applying the rule u will represent a possible
attack to the protocol security. It is important to note that, thanks to the admissibility of the
weakening rule (see Section 3.1), the previous LO∀ rule can be used to represent unsafe
configurations for any number of principals involved in sessions running in parallel with
the session carried over by alice and bob. Exploring all possible top-down derivations
however corresponds to an exhaustive search of the state space, and it would force us to fix
a given initial configuration.
A possible way to circumvent the problems due to forward exploration (top-down
provability) is to use an alternative evaluation strategy for LO∀ specifications. The
approach we propose in this paper is based on the bottom-up evaluation strategy of the
LO∀ program we introduced in Bozzano et al. (2004). The idea is as follows. Starting from
a set of facts of the form H , we compute all possible logical consequences with
respect to a given LO∀ program. Computationally, this evaluation strategy can be viewed
as a backward exploration of the state space of the system specified by the LO∀ theory.
As explained before, the set of facts can be used to symbolically express infinite sets
of violations of a given safety property. The bottom-up evaluation amounts to a fixpoint
computation defined over a transformation of sets of facts into sets of facts (such as the
classical TP operator used in the fixpoint semantics of logic programs).
For instance, in the context of security protocols, by evaluating bottom-up the LO∀
program obtained by merging the protocol and intruder theory with the symbolic
representation of unsafe states such as the clause u, we obtain the same effect using
backward reachability for a complex specification (with quantification and so on) carried
over in a completely open environment. Furthermore, if a fixpoint is reached (this is not
guaranteed in general) we can derive conditions on the initial states under which unsafe
configurations will not be reached.
7.1. Bottom-up evaluation for LO∀ specifications
In this section we introduce the basic ideas underlying the bottom-up evaluation scheme
of LO∀ programs. For more details, the reader may refer to Bozzano et al. (2004) and
Bozzano (2002). As mentioned in the previous section, we are interested in observing the
set of disjunctive atomic goals that are provable in a given program P . By admissibility of
weakening, we observe that ifA ∈ O(P) thenA+C ∈ O(P) (where ‘+’ denotes multiset
union) for any multiset C (of atomic formulas). In other words,O(P) is upward closed with
respect to multiset inclusion. We can exploit this property in order to ‘finitely’ represent
sets of provable goals by using the following idea. We will consider interpretations
consisting of multisets of non-ground formulas and we will lift their denotation to the
upward closure of their ground instances.
Formally, we give the following definitions. In the following, ΣP is the signature
associated to the program P , and SigP is the set of all extensions of ΣP with new constant
symbols.
Definition 7.1 (Herbrand Base). Given an LO∀ program P , the Herbrand base of P ,
denoted as HB(P), is given by
HB(P) = {A | A is a multiset of (non-ground) atoms in AVΣP }.
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Definition 7.2 (Interpretation). Given an LO∀ program P , an interpretation I is any
subset of HB(P). The denotation of an interpretation I , denoted as [[I ]], is the family of
ground interpretations {[[I ]]Σ }Σ∈SigP defined as follows:
[[I ]]Σ = UpΣ (InstΣ (I )),
where InstΣ and UpΣ are defined by InstΣ (I ) = {Aθ | A ∈ I }, UpΣ (I ) = {A + C | A
∈ I }, θ being a substitution over Σ and C a multiset over Σ .
The [[·]]Σ operator performs instantiation and upward closure. Given a set of multisets, it
saturates the set with respect to all multisets which can be obtained by variable instantiation
and multiset union from the original ones. Notice that, in the definition of [[·]]Σ , the
operations of instantiation and upward closure are performed for every possible signature
Σ ∈ SigP , i.e., for every possible extension of the program signature ΣP . Furthermore,
we assume the substitution θ and the multiset C to be defined over Σ (i.e., they may refer
to/contain only terms over Σ ). We say that an interpretation I is ground whenever all
multisets A ∈ I consist of ground atomic formulas.
Given an LO∀ goal G, we need to define a notion of satisfiability with respect to
our definition of interpretation. For this purpose, we introduce the following satisfiability
judgment:
I Σ ∆ C θ,
where I is an interpretation, ∆ is a multiset of goal formulas (a context), C is an output
multiset of atomic formulas, and θ is an output substitution. The judgment is used to
compute the set of resources C and the corresponding variable bindings that are needed
for ∆ to be provable in the interpretation I (in the following definition, I is intended to
denote the upward closure of an interpretation, according to Definition 7.2). Intuitively, if
I ΣP ∆ C θ holds then the sequent P, P ′ ΣP ∆θγ, Cθγ , γ being a grounding
substitution, is provable by augmenting P with the program P ′ consisting of clauses such
asA  for anyA ∈ [[I ]]ΣP . Technically, the idea behind the definition is that the output
multiset C and the output substitution θ are minimal (in a sense to be clarified) so they can
be computed effectively given a program P , an interpretation I , and a signature Σ . The
output substitution θ is needed in order to deal with clause instantiation, and its minimality
is ensured by using most general unifiers in the definition.
We give the following definition (for simplicity, we present only the formal definition
of the judgment for goals without conjunction; see Bozzano et al. (2004) for the complete
definition). Below, A\B denotes the multiset difference between A and B, |A| denotes
the cardinality of A, FV(A, C) denotes the set of free variables in A + C, and  denotes
multiset inclusion. Furthermore, we remark that in general, two multisets may have more
than one (not necessarily equivalent) most general unifier (see Bozzano et al. (2004)).
By using the notation m.g.u.(B′,A′), we mean any unifier which is non-deterministically
picked from the set of most general unifiers of B′ andA′.
Definition 7.3 (Satisfiability Judgment). Let P be an LO∀ program, I an interpretation,
and Σ ∈ SigP . The satisfiability judgment Σ is defined as follows:
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axiom : I Σ ,∆  nil;
anti : I Σ ⊥,∆ C θ, if I Σ ∆ C θ;
par : I Σ G1 G2,∆ C θ, if I Σ G1, G2,∆ C θ;
forall : I Σ ∀x .G,∆ C θ, if I Σ ,c G[c/x],∆ C θ,
with c /∈ Σ ;
atomic multiset : I Σ A C θ, if there exist B ∈ I (variant),B′  B,
A′  A,
|B′| = |A′|, C = B\B′, and θ = m.g.u.(B′,A′)|FV(A,C)
The rules presented above have a direct correspondence with the rules defining the top-
down provability of LO presented in Fig. 1 (as previously mentioned, here for simplicity
we have left out the rule for the conjunction). The first four rules are derived directly from
their top-down counterparts. The last rule deals with the case of atomic multisets. The
intuition underlying this rule is that the multiset of atomic formulas A is provable if it
possible to single out a sub-multiset A′ of A and a sub-multiset B′ of B, such that A′ and
B′ are unifiable. If this is the case, then what is left out in B (i.e., B\B′) is returned as the
output of the judgment (intuitively, B\B′ is required for A to be provable in I ), whereas
what is left out in A (i.e., A\A′) can be disregarded (intuitively, the admissibility of the
weakening rule ensures that if A′ is provable, then also A is provable). Finally, the output
substitution θ provides the variable bindings produced by the unification operation.
Remark 7.4. The notation I Σ ∆ C θ requires that ∆, C, and θ are defined over
Σ . As a consequence, the newly introduced constant c in the ∀-case of the Σ definition
below cannot be exported through the output parameters C or θ . In this way, universal
quantification is always resolved locally.
We are now ready to define the symbolic fixpoint operator SP working on our notion of
interpretation. Below, Vrn(P) denotes the set of clauses that are variant (i.e., renamed with
fresh variables) of clauses in P . Furthermore, we recall that, given H = A1 . . . Ak ,
Ĥ is the multiset A1, . . . , Ak .
Definition 7.5. Given an LO∀ program P and an interpretation I , the symbolic fixpoint
operator SP is defined as follows:
SP (I ) = {(Ĥ + C) θ | (H G) ∈ Vrn(P), I ΣP G C θ}.
Example 7.6. Let ΣP be a signature with a function symbol f and predicate symbols
p, q, r, s. Let I be the interpretation consisting of the multiset {p(x), q(x)} (for simplicity,
hereafter we omit braces in multiset notation), and P the program
1. r(w) q( f (w))
2. s(z) ∀x .p( f (x))
Let us consider (a renaming of) the body of the first clause, q( f (w′)), and (a renaming
of) the element in I , p(x ′), q(x ′). Using the atomic clause for the ΣP judgment, with
A = A′ = q( f (w′)), B = p(x ′), q(x ′), B′ = q(x ′), we get
I ΣP q( f (w′)) p(x ′) [x ′ → f (w′)].
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Thus, the multiset p( f (w′)), r(w′) belongs to SP (I ) (in fact, any of its instances is
provable in P enriched with p(x) q(x) ). This is not the only possible result of
applying SP . In fact we can apply the first clause to I by choosing A′ = B′ =  in
the atomic case of ΣP . Thus, the multiset A = p(x ′), q(x ′), r(w) belongs to SP (I ),
too. Notice that the latter multiset denotes redundant information with respect to the
denotations of B = p(x ′), q(x ′). In fact [[{A}]] ⊆ [[{B}]].
Let us consider now (a renaming of) the body of the second clause, ∀x .p( f (x)), and
another renaming of the single element in I , p(x ′′), q(x ′′). From the ∀-case of the ΣP
definition, I ΣP ∀x .p( f (x)) C θ if I ΣP ,c p( f (c)) C θ , with c /∈ ΣP .
Now, we can apply the atomic clause for ΣP ,c. Unfortunately, we cannot choose A′
to be p( f (c)) and B′ to be p(x ′′). In fact, by unifying p( f (c)) with p(x ′′), we should get
the substitution θ = [x ′′ → f (c)] and the output multiset q(x ′′) (notice that x ′′ is a free
variable in the output multiset) and this is not allowed because the substitution θ must be
defined on ΣP , in order for I ΣP ∀x .p( f (x)) C θ to be meaningful. It turns out
that the only way to use the second clause for ΣP ,c is to choose A′ = B′ = . In fact,
notice that goals of the form p(c1), r(c2) are not provable in P enriched with the axiom
p(x) q(x) .
Notice that the SP operator is defined using the judgment ΣP . This corresponds to the
idea that we are interested in observing only provable goals that are visible outside the
scope of programs with universal quantification. The constants that are introduced during a
derivation, in fact, cannot be exported outside the scope of the corresponding subderivation.
The operator SP is monotonic and continuous over the set of interpretations ordered with
respect to inclusion of their denotations (Bozzano et al., 2004). The fixpoint semantics
F(P) of an LO∀ program P is defined then as the least fixpoint of the operator SP .
Furthermore, the following property (proved in Bozzano et al. (2004)) holds.
Theorem 7.7 (Soundness and Completeness (Bozzano et al., 2004)). Let P be an LO∀
program. Then, O(P) = [[F(P)]]ΣP .
Finally, we can define an effective test for subsumption between multisets of non-ground
goals, in accordance with the notion of rich denotations of Definition 7.2. Intuitively,
B entails A if there exists A′  A such that B is more general than a permutation
of A′ (where multisets are viewed as lists of terms). Formally, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.8 (Bozzano et al., 2004). Given two interpretations I and J , [[I ]] ⊆ [[J ]] if
and only if for every A ∈ I , there exist B ∈ J , a substitution θ , and a fact C (defined over
ΣP ) s.t. A = Bθ + C.
This effective test can be used both to prune the set of multisets which are generated by
the least fixpoint computation built on top of the operator SP (i.e., to discard multisets
which are subsumed by other ones, during the intermediate steps), and also as a symbolic
termination test for the fixpoint computation. The resulting machinery represents then the
core of our bottom-up evaluation procedure for LO∀ programs. Sufficient conditions for
termination are discussed in detail in Bozzano et al. (2004).
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7.2. Verification as deduction
On the basis of the notions introduced in the previous sections, we can establish the
following connection between bottom-up evaluation (i.e., the semantics F(P) defined in
Section 7.1) of an LO∀ specification of an authentication protocol and its corresponding
security properties. Let Init be a collection of multisets of ground atomic formulas
(the initial states of a protocol), Tp be the LO∀ theory encoding a protocol P , Ti the
LO∀ intruder theory, and let U be a collection of LO∀ clauses A1 , . . . ,Ak 
(corresponding to the minimal violations of a secrecy property S). Furthermore, let
T = Tp ∪ Ti ∪ U . Then, we have the following properties.
Proposition 7.9 (Ensuring Secrecy). The protocolP is secure with respect to the intruder
with capabilities Ti , initial configurations Init, and the secrecy property S, and an inter-
leaving computational model for the agents behaviour, if and only if Init ∩ [[F(T )]] = ∅.
Proof. This result follows from Proposition 6.3 and Theorem 7.7. 
We remark that an if and only if condition holds in the previous proposition, i.e., the
bottom-up evaluation algorithm is correct and complete. As a corollary, we get the
following property (only if direction in the previous proposition), useful for debugging
purposes.
Corollary 7.10 (Proving Insecurity). If there exists A such that A ∈ Init ∩ [[F(T )]], then
in the interleaving computational model for the agents behaviour there exists an attack that
leads from the initial configurationA to an unsafe configuration B ∈ [[U ]].
8. Practical results
This section discusses the specification and analysis of some authentication protocols,
taken from the literature on security. Specifically, in addition to the ffgg protocol (which
has been presented in Section 5), we will discuss the Needham–Schroeder protocol (see
Section 2.2) in Section 8.2, a corrected version of the same protocol in Section 8.3, and
the Otway–Rees protocol (Otway and Rees, 1987) in Section 8.4. We will follow the
guidelines illustrated in Section 4. Experimental results for all the examples presented in
this paper, obtained using the tool presented in Bozzano (2002), are summarized in Fig. 14
(see Section 8.5).
8.1. Analysis of Millen’s ffgg protocol
Running our bottom-up evaluation algorithm on the ffgg specification (see Section 5),
we automatically find a violation to the security property of Fig. 6.
As in traditional model checking, counterexample traces can be automatically generated
whenever a violation is found. In particular, the trace corresponding to the above attack is
shown in Fig. 7 (we only post-processed the output of our verification tool to show the trace
in a more human-readable form). The trace in Fig. 7 corresponds to an LO∀ derivation
which leads from an initial state to a state violating the security property of Fig. 6.
The attack is exactly the parallel session one described in Millen (1999), that is, using
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Fig. 7. A parallel session attack on the ffgg protocol: al = alice; pid is principal p after execution of step i
with internal data d; pinit is principal p in its initial state; we have omitted the plain term constructor; we have
noted encrypted messages using the usual protocol notation;M(x, y, . . .) stands for the multiset m(x), m(y), . . .;
finally, Σ1 = Σ , n1, n2, Σ2 = Σ , n1, n2, n3, n4, and Σ3 = Σ , n1, n2, n3, n4, s.
Fig. 8. Specification of the Needham–Schroeder protocol.
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Fig. 9. Intruder theory for the Needham–Schroeder protocol.
Fig. 10. An attack on the Needham–Schroeder protocol: i stands for intruder, Σ1 = Σ , na, and Σ2 = Σ ,
na, nb.
the usual protocol notation (where primed numbers denote a session which is carried out
in parallel with the first one, whereas identifiers in parentheses indicate interference by the
intruder, i.e., interception of messages or sending of messages forged or modified by the
intruder):
1. A → B : A
1′. (A) → B ′ : A
2. B → (A) : N1, N2
2′. B ′ → (A) : N3, N4
2. (B) → A : N1, N3
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Fig. 11. Specification of the Otway–Rees protocol.
Fig. 12. Intruder theory for the Otway–Rees protocol.
3. A → B : {N1, N3, S}Kb
4. B → (A) : N1, N3, {N3, S, N1}Kb
3′. (A) → B ′ : {N3, S, N1}Kb
4′. B ′ → (A) : N3, S, {S, N1, N3}Kb
This attack is also an example of a type flaw attack, in that it relies on the secret S being
passed as a nonce (under the hypothesis that the lengths of the respective fields are the
same). In order to let the reader better understand the connection between bottom-up
evaluation and the top-down derivation shown in Fig. 7, we present below some of the
steps performed by the bottom-up evaluation algorithm. In the following we follow the
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Fig. 13. An attack on the Otway–Rees protocol: Σ1 = Σ , n1, na.
Fig. 14. Analysis of authentication protocols: experimental results.
same syntactical notation as in Fig. 7. Bottom-up evaluation starts from axiom u, i.e., we




where S is a free variable. Different clauses are applicable at this point. Among them is
decomposition rule i4. We can apply a variant of i4, let it be
n(X ′, Y ′, V ′KU ′ ) m(X
′) m(Y ′) m(V ′KU ′ )
to m1, in the following manner: unify S with Y ′ (hence unifying m(S) in the multiset
with m(Y ′) in the clause body) and consider the other two atoms in the body (i.e., m(X ′)
and m(V ′KU ′ )) as being implicitly contained in m1 (remember that interpretations are to be
considered upward closed). By applying the resulting clause backwards (i.e., the body is
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′, S, V ′KU ′ ).
Multiset m2 is accumulated into the current set of provable goals (other multisets can be
obtained by applying the remaining program clauses). Now, consider the application of a
variant of protocol rule p4, let it be
(B ′′)2A′′,N1′′ n({N1′′, X ′′, Y ′′}K B′′ ) (B ′′)4A′′ n(N1′′, X ′′, {X ′′, Y ′′, N1′′}K B′′ )
to m2, in the following way: unify V ′ with {X ′′, Y ′′, N1′′}, N1′′ with X ′, X ′′ with S, and
B ′′ with U ′ (thus unifying the atoms n(N1′′, X ′′, {X ′′, Y ′′, N1′′}K B′′ ) and n(X ′, S, V ′KU ′ )).




′′)2A′′,N1′′ , n({N1′′, S, Y ′′}K B′′ )
which is in turn accumulated as a provable goal. The reader may notice that an instance of
a principal B ′′ has been introduced in multiset m3. We also invite the reader to observe
the correspondence between the bottom-up construction that we are sketching and the
top-down construction illustrated in Fig. 7. Notice that the sequence of rules that we are
applying is the same but in the reversed order, i.e., axiom u, then rules i4 and p4, and so on
(clearly, we are illustrating only one of the possible bottom-up derivations). Furthermore,
every atom that we described as implicitly contained in the current multiset corresponds to
one of the atoms in the top sequent of Fig. 7. In other words, the bottom-up computation
starts from a multiset representing the minimal violations of the security property under
consideration (i.e., axiom u), whereas any additional atom that turns out to be involved in
the proof (see the top sequent in Fig. 7) is (implicitly) added, so to say, in a lazy manner as
the bottom-up construction proceeds. Variable bindings can also be (implicitly) enforced
during the bottom-up construction. For instance, the atom (B ′′)4A′′ (which we assumed to
be implicitly contained in m2) corresponds to the atom bob4al in the top sequent of Fig. 7.
Eventually, variable B ′′ (which is contained in m3) will be unified with bob, and similarly,
A′′ will be unified with al. Proceeding as above, by applying the rules i7 and i4 we get the
multisets (we leave the details to the reader)
m4) al3bob,S, bob
4
al, (B ′′)2A′′,N1′′ , m({N1′′, S, Y ′′}K B′′ )
m5) al3bob,S, bob
4
al, (B ′′)2A′′,N1′′ , n(W, Z , {N1′′, S, Y ′′}K B′′ )
Now, we can apply a variant of rule p4, let it be
(B ′)2A′,N1′ n({N1′, X ′, Y ′}K B′ ) (B ′)4A′ n(N1′, X ′, {X ′, Y ′, N1′}K B′ )
to m5, in the following way: unify B ′ and B ′′ with bob, A′ with al, N1′′ with X ′ and Z ,
Y ′′ with N1′ and W , and S with Y ′. We get the multiset
m6) al3bob,S, bob
2
al,Y ′′ , bob
2
A′′,N1′′ , n({Y ′′, N1′′, S}Kbob)
The reader may notice that the variable B ′′ has been unified with bob, as we pre-
viously anticipated. We conclude with an example of application of a clause involving
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universal quantification. We can now apply a variant of protocol rule p3 (compare with the
corresponding inference in Fig. 7), let it be
(A′)1B ′ n(N1
′, N2′) ∀S′. ((A′)3B ′,S ′ n({N1′, N2′, S′}K B′ ))
to m6. According to rule forall for the satisfiability judgment (see Definition 7.3), a new
constant, let it be c, has to be introduced in place of the universally quantified variable S′
in the body of the above clause. By unifying A′ with al, B ′ with bob, S with c, Y ′′ with
N1′, and N1′′ with N2′, we get the following multiset:




Notice that, according to rule forall for the satisfiability judgment (see also Remark 7.4), a
static check must be performed in order to ensure that the output multiset and unifier do not
contain the constant c. This check is successfully passed (note that the binding between the
variable S and the constant c is not contained in the output unifier, because of the restriction
to FV(A, C) which is enforced in the rule for atomic multisets in Definition 7.3); therefore
the above inference is perfectly legal. The bottom-up construction goes on in this way until
the multiset alinit, bobinit (corresponding to the bottom sequent in Fig. 7) is reached. We
leave the details to the reader.
We conclude by mentioning that we have also performed some further experiments as
regards Millen’s ffgg protocol, which we do not discuss in detail. In particular, we wanted
to ascertain the role of the two nonces N1 and N2 in the ffgg protocol. According to
the protocol specification introduced in Section 5, principal B only checks that the first
component of the last message is the nonce N1, whereas no check is performed for the
second component. We have verified that imposing the check on the second component,
the ffgg protocol is safe with respect to the security property and the intruder theory that
we have presented, while removing all checks, as expected, introduces serial attacks.
We think that this example is a good illustration of the capabilities of our general
framework. In fact, using the backward evaluation strategy championed in this paper, we
are able to automatically find a parallel session attack, without enforcing any particular
search strategy for our evaluation algorithm (i.e., the same algorithm can be used to find
serial or parallel attacks). Furthermore, according to Millen (1999) the ffgg protocol can be
generalized to protocols which only admit higher order parallel attacks (i.e., attacks which
take place only in the presence of three or more concurrent roles for the same principal).
Using the same algorithm, and the same protocol and intruder theories as before, we can
automatically find such attacks, if any exist. This distinguishes our methodology from most
approaches based on model checking, which operate on a finite-state abstraction of a given
protocol, and require the number of principals and roles to be fixed in advance.
Another advantage of using backward reasoning is related to the generation of nonces.
Forward exploration needs to explicitly manage the generation of fresh names. In contrast,
the backward application of LO∀ rules allows us instead to observe only formulas defined
over the signature of the original program. As an example of generation of a fresh name, the
reader may refer to the explanation of how the bottom-up search deals with the generation
of the secret S in the case of the ffgg protocol (discussed earlier in this section). In general,
assume that a rule body contains universally quantified variables that have to be matched
with an interpretation computed during the bottom-up evaluation of a program. By the
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definition of the satisfiability judgment (see Definition 7.3) and of the SP operator, we
can restrict ourselves to a local top-down derivation in which we simplify the body of the
clause (see rule forall and par of Definition 7.3) and then we match the resulting multiset
of formulas against the current interpretation (see rule atomic multiset of Definition 7.3).
In the end a static check is made in order to ensure that the output multiset and the resulting
unifier do not contain the constants which have been introduced. In other words, the effect
of quantification in the body of a clause is simply that of restricting the set of possible
predecessor configurations. In contrast, using top-down evaluation, the current signature is
enriched by adding a new constant every time the rule for the universal quantifier is used.
8.2. The Needham–Schroeder protocol
In this section we analyse the Needham–Schroeder public key authentication protocol
(Needham and Schroeder, 1978), previously introduced in Section 2.2. For the sake of
precision, we restrict our attention the fragment of the Needham–Schroeder protocol where
the key distribution phase (i.e., the messages exchanged with the trusted server) has been
omitted. The resulting protocol, corresponding to messages 3, 6, and 7 of Section 2.2, is as
follows:
1. A → B : {Na , A}Kb
2. B → A : {Na , Nb}Ka
3. A → B : {Nb}Kb
and has been implemented using the specification illustrated in Fig. 8 and the intruder
theory in Fig. 9. Let us discuss the rules in more detail.
The protocol rules have been encoded in the same way as for the ffgg protocol of
Section 5. All messages sent over the network are encrypted; therefore we have modelled
them using atomic formulas such as n(pubk(id), mess content), where id is a principal
identifier and mess content represents the message content. Internal states of principals
have been enriched in order to express the security violations to be investigated. The
intruder theory is shown in Fig. 9. It is analogous to the intruder theory for the ffgg protocol
presented in Section 5. In particular, rules i1 to i3 are the decomposition rules, whereas
rules i4 to i6 are the composition rules. The intruder can decrypt messages addressed to
himself/herself, whereas messages encrypted with other keys can only be stored as they
are. The composition rules allow the intruder to replay encrypted messages which have
been previously stored, and to compose messages from plain components and encrypt them
with an arbitrary key.
The specification of unsafe states is as follows:
u1) pr(alice, step3(NA, NB, bob)) m(NA) 
u2) pr(alice, step3(NA, NB, bob)) m(NB) 
u3) pr(bob, step4(NA, NB, alice)) m(NA) 
u4) pr(bob, step4(NA, NB, alice)) m(NB) 
That is, a state is unsafe if there exist two principals, say alice and bob, such that either
alice has run the protocol to completion with bob, or bob with alice, and at least one of
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the two nonces has been disclosed to the intruder. We call the security property specified
by the above rules strong correctness.
We can now run our verification tool on the resulting specification. As observed by
Lowe (1995), Needham–Schroeder protocol is not safe with respect to the above security
properties. In fact, we find the attack shown in Fig. 10, corresponding to the one presented
in Lowe (1995) (we have followed the same conventions as in Fig. 7). With the usual
protocol notation, the attack is as follows:
1. A → I : {Na, A}Ki
1′. (A) → B : {Na, A}Kb
2′. B → (A) : {Na, Nb}Ka
2. I → A : {Na, Nb}Ka
3. A → I : {Nb}Ki
3′. (A) → B : {Nb}Kb
The attack takes place because alice decides to contact the intruder, without knowing he/she
is cheating. Thus, the intruder is able to impersonate alice and cheat bob. Note that as a
result the protocol has been broken from the point of view of bob. In fact, bob thinks he
has got authentication with alice and that provided that alice is honest, the nonces have not
been disclosed to anyone else (which is false), whereas from the point of view of alice, she
correctly thinks that she has established authentication with the intruder (the nonces have
been disclosed to bob, but only because the intruder is cheating and alice does not know
that).
With this in mind, we can now try the following stronger security violations (we call
the corresponding security property weak correctness):
u′1) pr(alice, step3(NA, NB, bob)) pr(bob, step4(NA, NB, alice)) m(NA) 
u′2) pr(alice, step3(NA, NB, bob)) pr(bob, step4(NA, NB, alice)) m(NB) 
That is, we try to ascertain whether it is possible that two honest principals alice and bob
both believe that they have completed the protocol with each other, and still at least one
of the two nonces has been disclosed to the intruder (as the reader can easily verify, this
is not the case for the trace of the previous attack). This time the verification algorithm
terminates without finding any attack, thus proving that Needham–Schroeder protocol is
safe with respect to this property.
We conclude this section by showing how the methodology of invariant strengthening
can improve the verification algorithm performance. Invariant strengthening is a
conservative technique that can be used to speed up the fixpoint computation, and consists
in enriching the set of unsafe states with the negation of other invariants, which, intuitively,
encode further configurations which are assumed not to be reachable from the initial
configuration. A careful choice of the invariants to be added can speed up the fixpoint
computation dramatically (see experimental results in Fig. 14). The underlying intuition
is that, using the added invariants, the fixpoint computation may be able to generate
some consequences of the initial theory, which may help in pruning (via subsumption;
see Proposition 7.8) the current set of generated consequences (the net effect would be
that the intermediate steps generate fewer consequences, and the final fixpoint is smaller).
Even in the case in which the added invariant is already a consequence of the initial
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theory, the addition of the invariant may speed up the computation in that it may generate
consequences of the initial theory much earlier (in this case, the net effect would be that
the intermediate steps generate fewer consequences, even though the final fixpoint is the
same). We remark that the power of invariant strengthening is due to the combined use of
subsumption.
In the case of the analysis of the Needham–Schroeder protocol, we can augment the set
of security violations with this further axiom:
u′3) pr(alice, step1(NA, bob)) m(NA) 
Intuitively, this violation is never met. In fact, the nonce NA is created by alice during step 1
and sent to bob. If bob is honest, he will never send it to the intruder. Adding this rule has
the effect of accelerating convergence of the fixpoint computation (see the experimental
results in Fig. 14). Note that the following invariant is instead violated (the attack follows
the same scheme of the one in Fig. 10):
u′4) pr(bob, step2(NA, NB, alice)) m(NB) 
We stress that adding rules (including axioms) to the theory is always sound, in the sense
that if no attack is found in the augmented theory, no attack can be found in the original
one.
8.3. The corrected Needham–Schroeder protocol
As observed by Lowe (1995), the Needham–Schroeder protocol can be fixed with a
small modification. The problem with the original protocol is that the second message
exchanged does not contain the identity of the responder. Adding the responder’s identity to
this message prevents the intruder from replaying it, because now the initiator is expecting
a message from the intruder. The corrected version of Needham–Schroeder protocol is
1. A → B : {Na , A}Kb
2. B → A : {B, Na, Nb}Ka
3. A → B : {Nb}Kb
We need to make minor modifications to our previous specification. Namely, we modify
rules p2) and p3) by adding the additional argument B:
p′2) pr(B, init) n(pubk(B), plain(NA, A)) ∀NB.(pr(B, step2(NA, NB, A))
n(pubk(A), plain(B, NA, NB)))
p′3) pr(A, step1(NA, B)) n(pubk(A), plain(B, NA, NB))
pr(A, step3(NA, NB, B)) n(pubk(B), plain(NB))
and we add two rules for composition and decomposition of messages with three
components:
i7) n(enc(pubk(intruder), plain(X, Y, Z))) m(plain(X)) m(plain(Y ))
m(plain(Z))
i8) m(plain(X)) m(plain(Y )) m(plain(U)) m(plain(X))
m(plain(Y )) m(plain(U)) n(enc(pubk(Z), plain(X, Y, U)))
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We can now use our algorithm to automatically verify whether the protocol satisfies strong
correctness (axioms u1 through u4). As in Section 8.2, we can accelerate convergence
by means of invariant strengthening (see the experimental results in Fig. 14). We can
use the two invariants u′3 and u′4 discussed in Section 8.2, which should now both
hold. The verification algorithm terminates, proving that the modified version of the
Needham–Schroeder protocol is correct with respect to the notion of strong correctness.
8.4. The Otway–Rees protocol
The Otway–Rees protocol (Otway and Rees, 1987) provides a typical example of a type
flaw attack. It is intended for key distribution between two principals communicating with
a central server by means of shared keys (the protocol assumes symmetric key encryption;
see Section 2). The protocol is as follows (the form presented here is the one given in
Burrows et al. (1989)).
1. A → B : N, A, B, {Na , N, A, B}Kas
2. B → S : N, A, B, {Na , N, A, B}Kas , {Nb, N, A, B}Kbs
3. S → B : N, {Na , Kab}Kas , {Nb, Kab}Kbs
4. B → A : N, {Na , Kab}Kas
The protocol is run between two principals A and B , communicating with a trusted
server S by means of shared keys Kas and Kbs . The purpose of the protocol is to get a
new key Kab, generated by the trusted server, to be used as a shared key in subsequent
communications between A and B . At the first step, principal A generates a nonce N , to
be used as a run identifier, and a nonce Na , and sends to B the plaintext N, A, B and an
encrypted message, readable only by the server S, of the form shown. In turn, principal B
generates a nonce Nb and forwards A’s message to S, together with a similar encrypted
component. The server checks that the N, A, B components in the two messages match,
and, if they do, generates a new key Kab and replies to B with message 3 above, which
includes a component intended for B and one for A. The component intended for A is
forwarded to him/her by B with message 4.
We have encoded the Otway–Rees protocol with the rules in Fig. 11. Let us discuss
them in more detail. The encoding is similar to the previous ones, the only difference
being that we use a concatenation operator cons to glue together different components
inside the plaintext or the ciphertext. We have decided to use both the constructors plain
and cons in order to be consistent with the previous specifications, although in principle
using only one constructor might be sufficient. This example shows how it is possible to
capture some kinds of type flaw attacks. We use an identifier s for the trusted server, and
the notation sk(id, s) to denote the key shared between principal id and s. Rules p1 to p5
are a direct translation of the protocol steps written in the usual notation. As usual, we have
denoted the internal state of principals by means of term constructors such as stepi . When
the protocol is run to completion, the internal state of each of the two principals involved
contains the identity of the other principal and the new shared key obtained from the server.
The intruder theory is presented in Fig. 12. Rules i1 and i2 are the usual decomposition
rules for, respectively, messages with one encrypted component and with two encrypted
components. Rules i3 and i4 allow the intruder to arbitrarily decompose and re-assemble
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plain components. Finally, rules i5 and i6 are the usual composition rules. For simplicity,
we do not present the intruder rules for decrypting messages addressed to himself/herself,
and for encrypting messages with an arbitrary key (these rules can be formalized as was
done in the previous encodings).
We wish to verify whether the intruder can get the shared key which comes from a
protocol run between two honest principals, say alice and bob. The specification of unsafe
states is straightforward:
u1) pr(bob, step3(alice, KAB)) m(plain(KAB)) 
u2) pr(alice, step4(bob, KAB)) m(plain(KAB)) 
Running our verification tool, we automatically find the type flaw attack described in
Clark and Jacob (1997). The corresponding trace is shown in Fig. 13. The attack in the
usual protocol notation is as follows:
1. A → (B) : N, A, B, {Na , N, A, B}Kas
4. (B) → A : N, {Na , N, A, B}Kas
The attack takes place because a malicious intruder can intercept the first message, and,
after stripping it of the A and B components (in the plaintext part), replay it as the last
message of the protocol. The attack is successful under the hypothesis that the triple N , A,
B may be erroneously accepted, by the initiator of the protocol, as the desired key. This is
clearly a security flaw because the triple N , A, B is sent in clear in the first message, and
therefore publicly known. The Otway–Rees protocol provides a classical example of a type
flaw attack. Such attacks are very pervasive in authentication. Another classical example
of a type flaw protocol is the Yahalom protocol (Clark and Jacob, 1997).
8.5. Summary of the experimental results
In Fig. 14 we summarize the experimental results for the examples presented in this
paper. All the experiments have been performed on a Pentium III 700 MHz under Linux
RedHat 7.1, running Standard ML of New Jersey, Version 110.0.7. The tag Invar indicates
the use of invariant strengthening for accelerating fixpoint convergence. Furthermore,
Steps denotes the number of steps performed, Size the number of multisets inferred at
the last step of the computation (either before finding an attack or before reaching the
fixpoint), MSize is the maximal number of multisets inferred at any intermediate step, and
Time is the execution time in seconds. In the case of the Otway–Rees protocol, the level
of term nesting has been limited, in order to speed up the computation.
9. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have presented security protocols as a possible application field for
our methodology based on a linear logic-based specification language and on a bottom-
up evaluation strategy. Our verification procedure is tailored to study security violations
which can be specified by means of minimal conditions. While this may rule out interesting
properties, e.g., questions of belief (Burrows et al., 1989), the proposed approach can be
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used to study secrecy and confidentiality properties. No artificial limit is imposed on the
number of simultaneous sessions.
We have performed some experiments on different authentication protocols that show
that the methodology that we propose can be effective either for finding attacks of given
protocols, or for proving that no attacks may exist (clearly, with respect to a given protocol
theory and a given intruder theory). In other words, the bottom-up evaluation algorithm
presented in Section 7.1 is correct and complete: if no proof is found (with respect to the
given protocol and intruder theories), then no proof at all may exist.
We plan to overcome some current limitations of our approach; in particular we plan
to refine and automize the specification phase of protocols and of the intruder theory. As
regards the specification of protocols, we want to study a (possibly automatic) translation
between the usual informal description and our representation. As shown in the paper,
a one-to-one translation (one rule for every step) could be enough, provided that we
have a way to store the information about the internal state of principals. As regards the
specification of the intruder theory, in Section 4 we mentioned the fact that it is safe to
limit the capabilities of the intruder to the generation of messages having a shape that the
honest principals can recognize. In fact, in this paper we have defined intruder theories
specific to every example by specializing the generic rules of Cervesato et al. (1999) to the
message patterns of the different protocols. As part of our future work, we would like to
investigate this point more formally. In particular, following Lowe (1999), we would like
to have some formal results guaranteeing, under suitable hypotheses, that such a restriction
does not rule out attacks. Furthermore, we would like to automize the generation of the
specialized intruder theory from the corresponding protocol specification. For efficiency
reasons, it could also be worth investigating some optimizations to the intruder theory
(concerning, e.g., the rules for composition and decomposition of messages). We plan to
use techniques such as folding/unfolding for this purpose.
Finally, there is a lot of potential for optimizing the ML prototype used for the
experiments reported in Section 8. We believe that the tool can be engineered in such
a way as to be competitive (in terms of efficiency and flexibility) with existing tools.
Possible directions of improvement in order to optimize the performance include: using
sophisticated term management techniques, improving the subsumption checking function,
studying heuristics to prune and/or direct the search, and investigating the automatic
generation of invariants to speed up convergence of the fixpoint computation.
Another topic that we would like to investigate is typed multiset rewriting (Cervesato,
2001b), which extends multiset rewriting with a typing theory based on dependent
types with subsorting. Dependent types can be used to enforce dependency between an
encryption key and its owner. The paper (Cervesato, 2001b) also presents some extensions
which increase the flexibility of multiset rewriting specifications, e.g., using memory
predicates to remember information across role executions.
Finally, an open question is that of non-termination. In the few examples that we have
presented, our algorithm is always terminating, even without invariant strengthening (the
only exception being the Otway–Rees protocol, for which the analysis is terminating—
because an attack is eventually found—but the fixpoint computation does not converge,
due to generation of terms with arbitrary nesting). Although secrecy has been proved
to be undecidable, even for finite-length protocols with data of bounded complexity
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(Cervesato et al., 1999), one may ask whether a more restricted subclass of protocols exists,
for which the verification algorithm presented here is guaranteed to terminate.
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